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TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS AND
 
TOBACCO CONSUMPTION
 
Michael L. Marlow 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) believe 
that adequate funding of tobacco control programs by all 50 states 
would reduce the number of adults who smoke by promoting quit­
ting, preventing young people from ever starting, reducing exposure 
to secondhand smoke, and eliminating disparities in tobacco use 
among population groups. CDC has established guidelines for com­
prehensive tobacco control programs, including recommended fund­
ing levels, in Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Pro­
grams (CDC 1999; hereafter called Best Practices). Recommenda­
tions are based on best practices in nine program elements: 
community programs to reduce tobacco use, chronic disease pro­
grams to reduce the burden of tobacco-related diseases, school pro­
grams, enforcement, statewide programs, countermarketing, cessa­
tion programs, surveillance and evaluation, and administration and 
management. CDC recommends annual funding per capita to range 
from $7 to $20 in smaller states (population less than 3 million), 
$6–$17 in medium-sized states (population 3–7 million), and $5–$16 
in larger states (population more than 7 million). 
CDC (2002) estimates that total expenditures of $861.9 million in 
2002 were allocated to tobacco control from national and state 
sources in the United Sates, or $3.16 per capita. Actual spending in all 
states was roughly 56 percent of the “lower-bound” or minimum Best 
Practices funding recommendation for that year, with only six states 
(Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Ohio) meet­
ing or exceeding minimum recommendations, and 18 states providing 
less than 33 percent of recommended floors (CDC 1999). CDC 
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called for more than $3 billion in additional tobacco control spending 
in each of 2001 and 2002 to meet minimum Best Practices recom­
mendations. 
This article examines whether state tobacco control programs low­
ered both adult tobacco consumption and youth smoking during 2001 
and 2002 using newly available data published in CDC (2001, 2002) 
on expenditures of these programs. A secondary issue is whether or 
not divergence of actual funding from minimum Best Practices rec­
ommendations explains any of the differences between tobacco con­
sumption in the states. That is, does the fact that a state funds above 
or below minimum levels indicate anything about tobacco consump­
tion in that state relative to other states? The informational content of 
the Best Practices funding guidelines has not been previously exam­
ined. This study examines whether spending expansion along the lines 
of the Best Practices guidelines provides a useful benchmark based on 
past effectiveness of those programs in controlling tobacco consump­
tion. 
Previous Literature 
Studies of the impact of tobacco control programs often focus on 
consumption changes following a particular policy event such as a 
new control program. Manley et al. (1997) concluded that per capita 
monthly sales fell in states participating in the ASSIST (American 
Stop Smoking Intervention Study) program relative to states not par­
ticipating. Pierce et. al. (1998) reported that California control pro­
grams significantly lowered tobacco use. While these and other stud­
ies show falling tobacco use following implementation of new tobacco 
control programs, they fail to control for factors that may also cause 
consumption to fall. Tobacco control programs themselves therefore 
may or may not be causing observed declines in tobacco use and, even 
if in fact they do contribute, studies overstate impacts of control 
programs on tobacco use when they do not properly control for other 
contributing factors. 
Three studies control for one or more factors outside of the tobacco 
control programs themselves. Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995a) control 
for state excise taxes and tobacco firm media expenditures when 
concluding that state media expenditures, or counteradvertising, 
exert a negative impact on cigarette consumption. The authors mea­
sured tobacco control expenditures as “media placement expendi­
tures” by the Tobacco Control Section of the California Department 
of Health Services and calculated that California spent almost $20 
million over the 1980–93 study period. The authors suggest that 
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counteradvertising by tobacco control authorities may not be a par­
ticularly cost-effective method of lowering tobacco use because to­
bacco firms appear to effectively reverse this tobacco control policy 
through their own advertising. Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995b) esti­
mate that sales of cigarettes in California were reduced by 819 million 
packs from the third quarter of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 
1992 owing to an additional 25-cent state tax increase, while the 
anti-smoking media campaign reduced cigarette sales by 232 million 
packs during the same period. 
Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) examine the impact of 
state tobacco control expenditures on cigarette sales over 1981–2000 
and conclude that increases in such expenditures lower per capita 
cigarette sales after controlling for excise taxes, smuggling, and other 
state-specific factors. The authors collected their own data from fed­
eral, state, and private funding sources and then considered three 
specifications for estimating effects of expenditures on cigarette con­
sumption: contemporaneous, lagged annual, and cumulative. Lagged 
annual and cumulative specifications allow for past expenditures to 
affect current consumption. The authors concluded that past and 
current expenditures on tobacco control influence current tobacco 
use and, based on their empirical results, estimated that aggregate 
cigarette sales would have fallen by an additional 9 percent by year 
2000 if states had spent at minimum funding levels associated with 
CDC’s Best Practices. The authors did not directly examine the ef­
fectiveness of minimum Best Practices funding recommendations, 
but rather calculated the effect on consumption in their model if 
spending were to be increased to the minimum recommendation. 
This literature survey suggests that examination of more recent 
data is an obvious avenue for further research since data collected in 
Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) ended in 2000. The au­
thors report that real tobacco control expenditures averaged $1.22 in 
2000, which is below the averages of $3.73 (2001) and $4.00 (2002) in 
the CDC data set used here. More recent tobacco control programs 
therefore appear more generously funded, reflecting perhaps greater 
use of tobacco settlement revenues, greater urgency on the part of 
public health authorities to control smoking, or measurement differ­
ences between data sets. A new research avenue concerns whether 
the Best Practices funding recommendations are useful targets for 
states to follow when allocating additional funds to their tobacco 
control programs. This article addresses that issue by examining 
whether states that fund closer to the Best Practices guidelines exert 
greater reduction in tobacco use than those programs that do not. If 
so, then it might be argued that the Best Practices guidelines offer 
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useful comparisons of how well various state programs are funded 
according to a valid benchmark. 
Tobacco Control Funding and Expenditures 
While four states (Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon) 
were early pioneers in tobacco control programs, most states have 
only recently been funding programs in a comprehensive effort aimed 
at lowering tobacco use (CDC 2001, 2002). Programs previously re­
lied primarily on raising excise taxes to discourage tobacco use and 
this focus probably explains the extensive literature assessing price 
and tax elasticities of demand for tobacco. Laws on smoking in public 
places are another form of tobacco control program that vary consid­
erably across states. The American Lung Association (2004) ranks 
states by laws ensuring smoke-free air and, in 2003, gave three states 
(California, Delaware, and New York) a grade of A, seven states a 
grade of B, four states a grade of C, and all other states a grade of F. 
Following Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003), such laws can 
be considered a goal of tobacco control programs rather than a tool, 
thus allowing tobacco control expenditures to reflect a comprehensive 
array of tobacco control program characteristics. This assumption is 
applied to this study as well. 
State spending on tobacco control programs comes from a variety 
of sources. In 2004, for instance, the Government Accounting Office 
(GAO 2004) reported that 46 states received more than $12 billion in 
tobacco settlement revenues (Master Settlement Agreement), and 
that the four states (Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas) that 
settled independently with the tobacco industry also received sub­
stantial revenue. These funds included payments from tobacco com­
panies and, for some states, revenues from the securitized proceeds of 
the sale of bonds backed by future payments made to them by to­
bacco companies. However, the Master Settlement Agreement does 
not in any way dictate how funds are to be allocated, although there 
was some perception that states would significantly expand funding of 
tobacco control programs. Recent evidence, however, indicates that 
many of these dollars have gone toward closing state government 
deficits and costs associated with general health care programs (Gross 
et al. 2002; Johnson 2004; Sloan et al. 2005). State governments also 
may fund tobacco control programs through general revenues and 
from revenues stemming from tobacco taxation. For instance, CDC 
(2002) reports that 12 states appropriated $13.6 million from general 
revenue to support tobacco control programs in 2002. More than $8 
billion in fiscal year 2004 was collected in cigarette tax revenue in the 
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50 states and some of these dollars could also have been used to fund 
tobacco control programs (Orzechowski and Walker 2004). CDC 
(2002) estimates that state government investment in tobacco control 
for fiscal year 2002 totaled $774.7 million from tobacco settlement 
funds, state excise tax revenues, or general revenues. 
Funding also comes from federal and private sources. Federal 
funding of state tobacco control programs includes CDC’s Office on 
Smoking and Health that manages the National Tobacco Control 
Program, which provided $59 million during the 12 months ending in 
May 2002. The Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) provide sub­
stance abuse block grants that support state efforts as well. Private 
contributions to tobacco control programs come from such organiza­
tions like the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the American 
Medical Association. 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of per capita funding esti­
mates of tobacco control programs in 2001 and 2002. Data are avail­
able for all 50 states in 2001 and 48 states in 2002. Funding estimates 
in 2002 were not available at the time of publication of the data set for 
Arizona and Massachusetts. Average per capita funding was $3.73 in 
2001 and $4.00 in 2002, with ranges of $0.10–$20.82 in 2001 and 
$0.33–$19.16 in 2002. Best Practices average minimum per capita 
funding was $7.13 in 2001 and 2002. Thus, on average, states were 
only roughly funding a little more than one-half of recommended 
minimums.1 In 2001, only seven states (Indiana, Vermont, Missis­
sippi, Arizona, Massachusetts, Maine, and Ohio) were at or above 
minimum prescriptions and, in 2002, six states (Minnesota, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Maine, Ohio, and Hawaii) met this floor.2 In 2001, aver­
age (median) per capita “underfunding” was $4.05 ($4.22) and, in 
2002, it was $4.66 ($5.18). The data therefore exhibit substantial 
variation in actual funding levels as well as variation from prescribed 
floors defined by CDC’s Best Practices. For example, in 2002, Wyo­
ming was farthest below its Best Practices floor: it spent $4.16 per 
1The CDC (1999) Best Practices funding formula is based on experiences of California, 
Massachusetts, and other states with comprehensive programs, and is the sum of (1) 
countermarketing: $1.00–$3.00 per capita, (2) cessation (minimum): $1 per adult (screen­
ing) + $2 per smoker (brief counseling), and (3) cessation (covered programs): $1 per adult 
(screening) + $2 per smoker (brief counseling) + $13.75 per smoker (50 percent of program 
cost for 10 percent of smokers) + $27.50 per smoker (approximately 25 percent of smokers 
covered by state financed programs) + 10 percent of previous components for surveillance 
and evaluation + 5 percent of previous components for administration and management. 
2However, the two missing states in 2002, Arizona and Massachusetts, did exceed their Best 
Practices minimums in the previous year. 
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TABLE 1
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
TOBACCO CONTROL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA
 
Best Best 
Actual Practices Actual Practices 
2001 2001 2002 2002 
Average $3.73 $7.13 $4.00 $7.13 
Median 2.92 6.12 3.51 6.12 
Minimum 0.10 4.87 0.33 4.81 
Maximum 20.82 14.95 19.16 14.81 
Std. Dev. 4.06 2.45 3.64 2.46 
Sample Size 50 50 48 48 
capita, or $10.65 below the $14.81 floor. Hawaii was farthest above its 
floor: it spent $19.16 per capita, or $10.33 above its floor of $8.83. 
The funding data report CDC (2002) notes several limitations to 
this data collection. Reported amounts exclude appropriations for 
multiple purposes that included an unspecified amount of funding for 
tobacco control. State investments are based on appropriations, 
rather than expenditures, and the funding from national sources is 
based on award amounts. Expenditures may differ from appropriated 
or awarded amounts because of delays in implementation, program 
cuts, or the establishment of trusts or endowments. The report also 
does not evaluate whether funding was actually used to support com­
ponents defined in CDC’s Best Practices. Finally, the Best Practices 
guidelines do not disaggregate data to single out various components 
so it is impossible to determine relative effectiveness of counter-
advertising expenditures versus counseling expenditures versus any 
other spending category. It is unlikely that all components offer iden­
tical influences on tobacco consumption on a per-dollar basis, but 
examining various possibilities is currently not an option with this data 
set. 
Modeling the Effects of Tobacco Control 
Expenditures on Tobacco Use 
Equation (1) estimates the effects of tobacco control programs on 
tobacco consumption, holding constant other factors that might con­
tribute to changes in consumption. The dependent variable CIGi is 
the number of tax-paid per capita cigarette sales (in packs) and is 
obtained from Orzechowski and Walker (2004). The log of CIGi is 
578 
TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS 
examined so that the price elasticity is directly estimated when the log 
of the price variable is included on the right-hand-side of the equa­
tion. 
(1)	 CIGi = f(PRICEi, SMUGi, Yi, UEi, BAi, MORMONi, 
INDIANi, MILITARYi, CONTROLi) 
PRICEi is the real ($2,002) price per package of cigarettes in cents, 
as reported in Orzechowski and Walker (2004), and is expected to be 
inversely related to cigarette consumption. The log of price is used 
because it allows direct calculation of the price elasticity of demand. 
Federal and state excise taxes were also considered in place of prices 
per pack but results using taxes are not reported here because their 
use did not alter results of the empirical work. 
The dependent variable refers to legally sold cigarette packs 
whereby sellers collect excise taxes, but demanders also purchase 
cigarettes illegally smuggled across borders due to tax differentials. 
High-tax states are expected to lose some portion of total sales to 
neighboring states with lower tax rates and therefore taxed sales are 
too high in states from which cigarettes are bootlegged and too low in 
states to which cigarettes are smuggled. SMUGi controls for estima­
tion bias and is defined as the ratio of the tax for a given state to the 
population-weighted average of taxes for bordering states. A simple 
average of tax rates of surrounding states was also calculated but did 
not provide significantly different results from the one using a popu­
lation-weighted average. Values for Hawaii and Alaska are set to 1 
because they do not border other states and so they are assumed to 
exhibit neither tax advantages nor disadvantages relative to other 
states. This ratio is hypothesized to carry a negative sign because 
higher values indicate greater incentives for that state’s smokers to 
purchase from surrounding states offering lower taxes. 
It is common to control for smuggling, and past studies have shown 
that smuggling is an important determinant of a state’s cigarette de­
mand. However, significance of variables that measure tax differen­
tials of adjoining states is likely to diminish over time with rising 
Internet sales. Distance from seller clearly becomes a fading concern 
for buyers when they have access to low-tax cigarettes over the In­
ternet. Many Internet merchants are located in low-tax states such as 
North Carolina, Virginia, and Kentucky, as well as on American In­
dian reservations that sell untaxed cigarettes, thus suggesting that tax 
differentials between bordering states will become less important 
in determining a state’s cigarette sales (GAO 2002). It is expected 
then that over time smuggling variables based on cross-state border 
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measures will become less significant in empirical studies of the de­
mand for cigarettes. 
Yi controls for income and is defined as the real ($2,002) median 
income of a four-person family as published by the U.S. Census. The 
sign on Yi is ambiguous since, while cigarettes may be an income-
elastic good that indicates a positive sign, higher income individuals 
may also smoke less if they exhibit greater health concerns over smok­
ing, thus suggesting a negative sign. The sign is therefore an empirical 
question. The unemployment rate UEi comes from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. The effect of unemployment rates on consump­
tion is ambiguous because higher values may cause more smoking due 
to greater anxiety over job loss, or higher values may lead to reduced 
consumption due to fewer jobs. BAi, the percentage of population 
aged 25 and over with a bachelor’s degree or more, is obtained from 
the U. S. Census and controls for the expectation that consumption 
falls with education. 
The percentage of the population that is Mormon, MORMONi, 
controls for a population group that discourages smoking among its 
disciples and is therefore expected to exert a negative effect on con­
sumption. This measure is obtained from data complied by Green 
(2004). INDIANi is the percentage of population in 2003 of Native 
American descent and MILITARYi is the percentage of population in 
active military duty in 2002. Both variables control for availability of 
untaxed cigarettes in a state and are calculated from U.S. Census data. 
Both are expected to exert negative effects on cigarette consumption. 
Finally, CONTROLi is the CDC-defined tobacco control expendi­
ture per capita variable defined previously. Regressions were run with 
tobacco control expenditures as a percentage of gross state product as 
an alternative measure of the size of tobacco control programs and are 
not shown here because this substitution did not significantly change 
results. Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) found evidence of 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of tobacco control expenditures 
on cigarette consumption using data the authors themselves col­
lected. CDC currently provides two years of data—2001 and 2002— 
and so the present examination is limited to a two-year time span. 
However, this study controls for past spending in the four states 
(Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon) known to have rela­
tively long-lived and large control programs.3 Examination is con­
ducted on whether spending and tobacco consumption in these four 
3Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) ran separate regressions on these four states 
along with their examinations of all states together. 
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states differ significantly from other states and will suggest whether 
lagged effects have led to significant reductions in tobacco use beyond 
those experienced by other states. A spending slope dummy is con­
structed using dichotomous variables that take the value of 1 for these 
four states and 0 otherwise, and allows for testing of differences 
experienced by these long-standing programs. 
Table 2 displays summary statistics of all variables defined above 
for the two years of data. 
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
2001 2001 2002 2002 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
CIG 81.70 25.01 79.90 24.00 
PRICE 358.00 37.80 393.00 56.40 
SMUG 0.96 0.61 1.03 0.82 
Y 56,752.97 7,532.66 58,633.58 7,707.34 
UE 4.48 0.87 5.32 1.01 
BA 24.93 4.31 26.00 4.52 
MORMON 2.62 8.46 2.62 8.46 
INDIAN 1.75 3.05 1.75 3.05 
MILITARY 0.46 0.55 0.46 0.55 
CONTROL 3.73 4.06 4.00 3.64 
NOTES: Values for MORMONi, INDIANi, and MILITARYi, are the same for 
both years. 
Estimates of the Effects of Tobacco Control 
Spending on Tobacco Sales 
Table 3 displays ordinary least squares estimates of cigarette de­
mand. Years 2001 and 2002 are pooled together yielding 98 observa­
tions in total, with two missing observations because Arizona and 
Massachusetts did not meet the reporting deadline for the CDC 
(2002) publication. The Chow test involving equality of coefficients of 
the two different (year) regressions indicated failure to reject the 
hypothesis of equal coefficients and so pooling of data is appropriate. 
The first column shows that cigarette price exerts a significant and 
negative effect on per capita tobacco consumption with an estimated 
elasticity coefficient of -0.90 and is in line with the literature showing 
that the demand for tobacco is inelastic. The smuggling incentive 
variable exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on 
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consumption, thus supporting the hypothesis that a rise in a state’s tax 
relative to bordering states lowers that state’s sales of taxed cigarettes. 
Income and unemployment rates do not exert effects that are differ­
ent from zero. Percentage of population with at least a bachelor’s 
degree and percentage of population that is Mormon are estimated to 
exert negative effects on consumption. The percentage of population 
in active military and the percentage of population of Native Ameri­
can descent do not exert significant effects on taxed cigarette sales. 
Finally, per capita expenditure of tobacco control programs does not 
exert a statistically significant effect on tobacco sales thus conflicting 
with Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) which found contem­
poraneous and lagged expenditures exerting significant and negative 
effects on tobacco consumption over 1981–2000. 
The second column estimates tobacco consumption and controls 
for the possibility that past control efforts of the four states (Arizona, 
California, Massachusetts, and Oregon) with long-standing tobacco 
control programs are an important determinant of current tobacco 
sales. The results indicate no changes in the control variables that 
were previously significant in estimates in column (1) except percent­
age of population in active military duty that now exerts a negative 
effect on consumption. The slope dummy for the tobacco control 
spending variable is significant and negative thus indicating that, 
while an additional dollar in the four states with long-standing pro­
grams lowers tobacco consumption, this effect does not exist in the 
other states as a group. 
The final three columns of Table 3 display estimations of tobacco 
consumption that control for underfunding by state tobacco con­
trol programs to determine if divergence of actual funding from the 
Best Practices recommendations explains any of the variation in ciga­
rette sales. Three dummies are constructed that qualitatively measure 
different thresholds of underfunding: 25 percent, 50 percent, and 
75 percent. That is, the first dummy equals 1 if tobacco control 
funding is less than or equal to 25 percent of the Best Practices floor 
for that state. Similar dummies are defined for thresholds of 50 per­
cent and 75 percent. The following numbers of observations meet the 
underfunding definitions: 36 at the 25 percent threshold, 56 at 50 
percent, and 78 at 75 percent. Both intercept and tobacco control 
spending slope dummies are inserted into the basic equation in col­
umn (1). States that spend at or above the spending floors are ex­
cluded in these estimations to allow a focus on those states failing to 
meet funding floors. A separate regression was also run on the full 
data set that included slope and intercept dummies measuring wheth­
er or not a state was underfunded and, because neither slope nor 
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intercept dummies were statistically significant, this regression is not 
displayed here. The results of this separate regression indicate that 
simply achieving the spending floor does not provide an effect on 
consumption that differs from states failing to achieve their floors— 
both groups of states do not show any significant effect on consump­
tion from their tobacco control spending. 
The intercept dummy is significant and positive in the cases of 
thresholds of 50 percent and 75 percent, but spending slope dummies 
are never found to exert significant influences. States failing to meet 
these two thresholds have higher intercepts than other states thus 
indicating higher base levels of cigarette sales. However, states failing 
to meet thresholds do not exhibit any different relation between 
tobacco control spending and cigarette sales than states meeting 
thresholds. That is, there is no effect of tobacco control spending on 
consumption. Contrary to previous estimation, coefficients on Native 
American shares of the population are now significant and negative in 
equations with 50 percent and 75 percent thresholds. In sum, while 
there is evidence that underfunded states exhibit higher base levels of 
cigarette consumption, there is no evidence indicating that higher 
funding would exert effects on consumption that differ according to 
the degree to which they are underfunded. 
Estimates of the Effects of Tobacco Control on 
Youth Smoking 
The relationship between tobacco control spending and youth 
smoking is of great interest because youth smoking prevention is 
often cited as a vital component of any tobacco control program. 
Lowering youth smoking is believed to be key to lowering consump­
tion by the same group when they become adults. The basic equation 
(1) is reestimated for 2002 with the same independent variables as 
before, but with the youth smoking rate as the dependent variable. 
CDC (2003) defines youth smoking as “current cigarette smoking” in 
grades 9–12, which occurs when students “smoked cigarettes on 1 or 
more of the 30 days preceding the survey.” Data on youth smoking 
are available for 46 states in 2002. However, with one missing value 
for tobacco control program spending, there are 45 observations. 
Three specifications for tobacco control spending are considered: 
contemporaneous, contemporaneous and one lagged year separately, 
and contemporaneous and one lagged year combined. Unfortunately, 
control for whether the four states with longer-standing programs 
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exhibit significant differences from other states in their impact on 
youth smoking could not be conducted because of insufficient obser­
vations on these four states. 
Table 4 displays three estimations utilizing the three different to­
bacco control spending specifications. The evidence indicates that 
four variables exert significant effects on youth smoking: smuggling 
TABLE 4
 
EFFECTS OF TOBACCO CONTROL SPENDING ON
 
YOUTH SMOKING
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
PRICE −0.100 −0.010 −0.010 
(0.76) (0.73) (0.77) 
SMUG −0.630*** −1.630*** −1.628*** 
(1.85) (1.82) (1.85) 
Y −.0002 −.0001 −.001 
(1.65) (1.62) (1.65) 
UE −0.288 −0.304 −0.297 
(0.39) (0.40) (0.42) 
BA −0.356** −0.356** −0.356** 
(2.08) (2.04) (2.08) 
MORMON −0.300* −0.300* −0.300* 
(4.39) (4.32) (4.39) 
INDIAN 0.501* 0.497** 0.498** 
(2.18) (2.10) (2.19) 
MILITARY −0.933 −0.843 −0.869 
(0.68) (0.51) (0.70) 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 0.041 0.012 
TOBACCO CONTROL (0.20) (0.03) 
LAGGED TOBACCO 0.027 
CONTROL (0.10) 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 0.020 
& LAGGED TOBACCO (0.22) 
CONTROL 
INTERCEPT 55.39* 53.38* 55.37* 
(7.55) (7.43) (7.54) 
Std. error of regression 3.959 4.017 3.959 
Observations 45 45 45 
F-statistic 5.60 4.90 5.60 
R2 (adjusted) 0.48 0.47 0.48 
Mean, dependent variable 30.29 30.29 30.29 
NOTES: t-scores in parentheses; 2-tailed tests: *1 percent, **5 percent, ***10 
percent. 
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incentives (negative sign), percent of population with bachelor’s de­
gree (negative sign), that are Mormon (negative sign), and of Native 
American descent (positive sign). Cigarette price, income, unemploy­
ment, percent of population on active duty, and all tobacco control 
spending specifications never exert effects statistically different from 
zero, thus indicating no evidence that spending on tobacco control 
programs leads to lower youth smoking. These results support the 
earlier empirical evidence that tobacco control programs do not in­
fluence taxed cigarette sales. 
Table 5 examines whether extent to which underfunding exists 
explains any of the variation of youth smoking by including above-
discussed thresholds of 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent to the 
youth smoking equation. Only the specification with the contempo­
raneous spending on tobacco control variable is displayed because 
estimations with lagged spending do not exhibit any significant dif­
ferences. The following numbers of observations meet the under-
funding definitions: 17 at the 25 percent threshold, 25 at 50 percent, 
and 38 at 75 percent. Both intercept and spending on tobacco control 
slope dummies are again considered. 
The results indicate that the underfunding status of state spending 
programs do not explain any of the variation in youth smoking be­
tween states. However, the Native American variable is no longer 
significant in any of the three estimations (was positive and significant 
in Table 4). Smuggling, real income, education, and Mormon vari­
ables are significant and negative in all estimations. In sum, under-
funding status does not explain any of the variation between youth 
smoking in the states. 
Conclusion 
This article finds little or no evidence that tobacco control spending 
exerted significant effects on overall cigarette sales or youth smoking 
in 2001 and 2002, and this evidence is not influenced by the degree 
to which states diverge from the CDC Best Practices guidelines. The 
CDC’s guidelines, therefore, do not appear to indicate productive 
benchmarks for states on whether to expand funding of tobacco con­
trol programs. 
Why might these results conflict with previous research? Previous 
examination focused on cross-sectional and time series data, while the 
present study examines two adjoining years (2001 and 2002) of cross-
sectional data. Other than possible differences in data collection 
methods, differences in time periods may be contributing to the 
different conclusions. CDC (2004) estimates that adult smoking 
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TABLE 5
 
EFFECTS OF TOBACCO CONTROL SPENDING WITH THRESHOLDS
 
ON YOUTH SMOKING
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Threshold Dummy 
PRICE 
25 percent 
0.010 
50 percent 
0.010 
75 percent 
0.020 
SMUG 
(0.65) 
−3.140** 
(0.60) 
−3.616** 
(0.93) 
−3.568** 
(2.19) (2.54) (2.35) 
Y	 −0.0002*** −0.0002*** −0.0002*** 
−1.720 −2.050 −1.730 
UE	 −0.550 0.011 −0.723 
(0.65) (0.01) (0.75) 
BA −0.587* −0.573* −0.614* 
(3.06) (2.99) (3.14) 
MORMON −0.273* −0.277* −0.262* 
(3.99) (4.09) (3.76) 
INDIAN 0.108 0.242 0.149 
(0.37) (0.80) (0.51) 
MILITARY 1.747 0.902 2.181 
(0.85) (0.41) (1.00) 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 0.617 0.632 0.161 
TOBACCO CONTROL (1.45) (1.39) (0.25) 
THRESHOLD DUMMY 2.823 3.003 −0.118 
(1.23) (1.14) (0.24) 
THRESHOLD DUMMY −0.879 −0.173 −0.100 
× TOBACCO (1.25) (0.27) (0.14) 
CONTROL 
INTERCEPT	 53.40* 51.79* 56.77* 
(7.18) (6.85) (6.42) 
Obs. below threshold 17 25 38 
Std. error of regression 3.812 3.795 3.914 
Observations 39 39 39 
F-statistic 5.32 5.39 4.92 
R2 (adjusted) 0.55 0.56 0.53 
Mean, dependent variable 30.51 30.51 30.51 
NOTES: t-scores in parentheses; 2-tailed tests: *1 percent, **5 percent, ***10 
percent. 
prevalence declined from 33.2 percent in 1980 to 22.5 percent in 2002. 
A potential problem with examining time series data is that a portion of 
the fall in tobacco consumption is probably due to heightened health 
concerns of the public over smoking that are unrelated to tobacco 
control programs in place. It is clearly difficult to separate effects 
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from growing health concerns that are unrelated to tobacco control 
programs from those related to tobacco control programs, and per­
haps previous examination of time series data overestimated effects 
from the latter on cigarette consumption. The present study is prob­
ably little affected by this issue because it is unlikely that significant 
changes in health concerns took place between 2001 and 2002. 
It has also been assumed that tobacco control spending is exoge­
nous in both this study and past studies, but spending decisions may 
be influenced by factors that also influence tobacco consumption.4 
For example, numbers of smokers or tobacco-related jobs may influ­
ence state spending in ways similar to research showing that proba­
bilities that states pass laws prohibiting smoking in public places are 
influenced by those same factors.5 A potential endogeneity problem 
arises if states with relatively rapid declines in tobacco consumption 
are also more likely to fund tobacco control programs more gener­
ously than other states. An inverse relationship between tobacco con­
trol spending and tobacco consumption may then simply mean that 
states characterized by greater distaste toward smoking also spend 
more on tobacco control programs than other states. This possibility 
is suggested in this article because the four states with long-standing 
tobacco control programs are also states that have experienced de­
creased cigarette sales and rising spending on tobacco control. Of 
course, it is also possible that this inverse relationship might indicate 
that spending more on tobacco control leads to lower tobacco con­
sumption. Testing of these competing hypotheses regarding causality 
is clearly critical to our understanding of how tobacco control pro­
grams influence tobacco use and would appear to be a productive 
area for future research. 
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